How China, Russia, and Iran could stoke post-election unrest in US

With the November 5 US presidential elections just over two weeks away, Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump remain engaged in a close contest. The various opinions polls are predicting a very a tight race which may finally be decided by a few thousand voters in so-called swing states.
The neck and neck race between Harris and Trump has raised the prospects of meddling by foreign players in the US presidential polls.

Driving the news

The declassified report by the National Intelligence Council has warned that foreign adversaries, including China, Russia, and Iran, are likely to exploit post-election vulnerabilities in the US to fuel unrest and deepen political divides after the 2024 election.
The seven-page memorandum also says Tehran’s efforts to assassinate former President Donald Trump and other former US officials are likely to persist after Election Day regardless of the result.
These countries have a history of meddling in US elections through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and indirect support of protests. This time, they could intensify their efforts, capitalizing on existing tensions to destabilize the election’s aftermath.

Why it matters

While US elections are highly secure, the period following Election Day—especially during vote tabulation, certification, and the peaceful transfer of power—remains vulnerable to foreign influence.
By amplifying protests or pushing disinformation, these adversaries could disrupt or delay the democratic process. This threat is particularly concerning given the heated political environment, with the risk of foreign powers exploiting any unrest for their geopolitical gain.

The big picture

The report highlights that these foreign actors are well-positioned to take advantage of America’s politically charged atmosphere. They could use cyberattacks, information operations, and even indirect encouragement of protests to undermine confidence in the election results and disrupt critical post-election processes.
Cyber threats: According to the report, Russia, China, and Iran all possess the technical capacity to conduct cyberattacks against US election infrastructure. However, the intelligence community assesses that they are unlikely to alter vote counts, as doing so would almost certainly be detected and carry a high risk of retaliation. Instead, these countries could focus on more subtle methods, such as spreading disinformation about vote tabulation and unofficial reporting, which could lead to confusion or doubts about the integrity of the election.
Example: A pro-Russia group, Killnet 2.0, announced its intent to interfere with the 2024 US election, though it did not specify how before deleting its post.
Disinformation campaigns: Disinformation remains a critical tool for these actors. The report notes that foreign adversaries might amplify doubts or false narratives about the election process during the period when results are still being finalized. By sowing mistrust in institutions or leveraging protests, they can exploit divisions and create an environment of uncertainty and fear.
In January, Russia’s GRU attempted to recruit an unwitting US individual to organize protests. Iran has also been active, encouraging US persons to attend protests, such as a pro-Palestinian demonstration in Washington, DC, earlier this year.

Between the lines

Foreign adversaries aren’t necessarily creating unrest from scratch—they are amplifying existing divisions within the US. The report stresses that countries like Russia, China, and Iran are more likely to stoke protests that emerge organically rather than initiate them directly.
Iran’s strategy: Iran could use cyber-enabled influence operations, including leaking sensitive information (doxing) and even inciting violence. In 2020, Iranian cyber actors, likely affiliated with the IRGC, created a website with death threats against US election officials and published personally identifiable information to incite further unrest.
Russia’s focus: Russia is likely to repeat its playbook from previous elections, using social media campaigns to amplify disinformation, particularly around vote counting, certification, and the Electoral College process. Moscow’s long-term goal is to undermine US democratic institutions and political stability by fostering discord.
China’s subtle approach: China is more cautious in its approach but may take advantage of existing protests or misinformation, subtly pushing narratives that question the legitimacy of US democratic systems. While less overt than Russia and Iran, China’s influence campaigns could still contribute to destabilizing the political landscape.

Zoom in: Post-election vulnerabilities

The intelligence report underscores that foreign actors are likely to perceive several vulnerabilities during the post-election period. From vote tabulation to the certification of results, these stages are critical and could be disrupted if protests or disinformation campaigns gain traction.
Vote tabulation and reporting: Foreign actors might exploit the delay between voting and the finalization of results to spread disinformation, questioning the accuracy of the vote count. Although official vote tabulation is secure, the period before results are certified could be a prime target for foreign influence.
Protests and violence: The report highlights the risk that foreign adversaries could encourage or amplify protests, particularly those that become violent. In some states, election certification requires in-person meetings, making the process vulnerable if large-scale protests or threats prevent officials from accessing the necessary venues.
Example: If protests persist beyond Election Day, foreign actors could capitalize on these disruptions to impede the certification process or the Electoral College meeting. This is particularly concerning in states with rigid legal frameworks that don’t allow for virtual certification, heightening the risk of a procedural breakdown.

What they are saying

“Foreign-driven or amplified violent protests, violence, or physical threats to election workers or state and local officials could challenge state and local officials’ ability to conduct elements of the certification and Electoral College process,” the report cautions. This could extend beyond the election results, potentially disrupting the inauguration process as well.
The report also underscores that the threats may not end with the election but could persist through Inauguration Day, particularly if protests and physical threats continue. In this context, foreign adversaries are likely to further denigrate the US political system, using every opportunity to widen domestic divides.

What’s next

To counter these threats, the report recommends a multi-pronged approach involving direct warnings to adversaries, public messaging to “prebunk” or debunk false narratives, and proactive communication between local officials and law enforcement. Although it may be difficult to fully dissuade adversaries from engaging in post-election interference, increasing public awareness and resilience against disinformation can mitigate some of the impacts.
The US is better prepared now than in previous election cycles, having developed more robust defenses against cyberattacks and foreign disinformation campaigns. However, the political landscape remains fragile, and foreign adversaries are likely to continue testing the limits of US defenses.
(With inputs from agencies)